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COMMENTARY

The best predictions in experimental biology are critical and
persuasive
Douglas S. Fudge1, * and Andy J. Turko2

A powerful way to evaluate scientific explanations (hypotheses) is to
test the predictions that they make. In this way, predictions serve as
an important bridge between abstract hypotheses and concrete
experiments. Experimental biologists, however, generally receive
little guidance on how to generate quality predictions. Here, we
identify two important components of good predictions – criticality and
persuasiveness – which relate to the ability of a prediction (and the
experiment it implies) to disprove a hypothesis or to convince a
skeptic that the hypothesis has merit. Using a detailed example, we
demonstrate how striving for predictions that are both critical and
persuasive can speed scientific progress by leading us to more
powerful experiments. Finally, we provide a quality control checklist to
assist students and researchers as they navigate the hypotheticodeductive method from puzzling observations to experimental tests.
KEY WORDS: Scientific method, Hypothesis testing,
Experimental design

Introduction

The scientific method (i.e. the hypothetico-deductive method) is a
powerful means of discovery because it provides a mechanism for
evaluating explanations of how the world works, allowing us to
reject bad explanations and increase our confidence in good ones
(Deutsch, 2011). The difference between good and bad explanations
has everything to do with the predictions they make; good
explanations make accurate predictions, and bad explanations fail
this test (Feynman et al., 1965). In this Commentary, we discuss
how to answer open-ended questions by testing competing
explanations, focusing on the predictions the explanations make
and where those predictions diverge. We argue that the best
predictions have the potential to do two things – disprove incorrect
explanations and increase confidence in correct ones. We also
provide a checklist that we hope will be useful for experimental
biologists and students as they make the most of limited time and
resources to tackle open-ended questions (Box 1).
First, let us clarify what we mean by open-ended questions. These
are questions for which the range of possible answers is not
constrained and it is not obvious how they should be answered.
Often, these questions inquire about mechanistic explanations of
natural phenomena, usually taking the form ‘How does this work?’
or ‘Why does this occur?’. Many ‘big’ questions in biology are
open-ended – for example, ‘How do animals maintain
homeostasis?’ or ‘Why does individual variation persist?’ – and
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answers to open-ended questions therefore often form the basis for
general theory. However, many specific and fascinating natural
history questions are also open-ended. Consider an observation that
our undergraduate marine biology students recently made while
exploring the rocky intertidal zone in Maine, USA. They noticed
aggregations of the marine springtail Anurida maritima floating on
the surface of several tidepools (Fig. 1), which led them to ask ‘Why
do these animals form rafts?’. Although this is a simple question, it
is also a difficult one, because it is not obvious how to go about
answering it. Possible answers to this question (i.e. explanations)
range widely, from physical mechanisms (e.g. they stick to each
other like Cheerios in a bowl of milk) to biological ones (e.g. their
food occurs in patches and they go where their food is). In contrast
to open-ended questions, constrained questions have fewer possible
answers. For example, we might ask the question ‘What is the effect
of wind speed on the size of A. maritima rafts?’. The form that the
answer to this question will take is obvious (increased wind speed
might increase raft size, decrease it or have no effect), as is the
experiment you could do to answer it (expose springtails to varying
wind speeds and measure raft size). We do not wish to minimize the
complexities of answering constrained questions; indeed, they often
require elaborate experimental designs, impressive technical skill
and sophisticated use of statistics. Our point is that open-ended
questions are particularly difficult because the number of potential
answers is unlimited, and it is these kinds of questions that we will
focus on in this Commentary.
What makes a good prediction?

The hypothetico-deductive method is a particularly powerful tool
for answering open-ended questions (Deutsch, 2011). In his seminal
paper on ‘strong inference’, Platt (1964) sums up the hypotheticodeductive method in three steps: (1) devise alternative explanations
(in science, these are called hypotheses); (2) devise a crucial
experiment (i.e. one that can disprove one or more of the hypotheses
under consideration); and (3) carry out the experiment so as to get a
clean result. The vast majority of the training that we give and
receive as experimental biologists focuses on step 3 of this process,
i.e. experimental design and data analysis. Step 1, hypothesis
generation, is a fascinating and mysterious creative process (Fudge,
2014), but it is not our focus here. Step 2, which involves moving
from a list of alternative hypotheses to a ‘crucial experiment’ is not
as simple as it sounds in Platt’s instructions. In the remainder of this
Commentary, we will demonstrate how predictions can be a
powerful tool for navigating this transition from step 1 (hypothesis
generation) to step 2 (crucial experiment).
Before we discuss how to come up with crucial experiments, we
would like to address a common misconception about the function
of predictions when using the hypothetico-deductive method. Our
use of the word ‘prediction’ does not simply mean a guess about
how an experiment will turn out (Hutto, 2012). Instead, predictions
are the logical outcomes of hypotheses under a given set of
1
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conditions, and therefore they must be considered before the
experiments are designed. In fact, it is the act of finding these
predictions that leads us to our experiments. Although it is not
obvious from the way that the hypothetico-deductive method is
often taught, making predictions for constrained questions has little
to no utility (Hutto, 2012). For example, if we want to know the
effect of wind speed on springtail rafts, we can just conduct our
experiment and find the answer. In this case, generating an a priori
guess about the results is nothing more than a distraction and might
even bias our data collection.
As mentioned above, when Platt refers to a ‘crucial experiment,’
he means one that has the potential to disprove one or more of the
hypotheses under consideration, and the best way to disprove a
hypothesis is to test the predictions that it makes. But how exactly do
we figure out what a particular hypothesis predicts? We have
learned from teaching this method to our students (and from our
own struggles) that it is all too easy to make flawed predictions.
Flawed predictions are ones that don’t align with the hypothesis, that
aren’t clear about the experimental test or that won’t yield useful
information if they are tested. We have therefore devised some
simple guidelines for evaluating predictions before proceeding to
the experimental testing phase. To evaluate the quality of a
prediction, we always ask ourselves the following two important
questions. (1) What would you learn if the prediction were found to
be false? Would such a result force you to reject the hypothesis that
made the prediction? If the answer is yes, we call this a ‘critical
prediction’. The importance of criticality has been recognized for a
long time, as falsification of a hypothesis necessarily relies on
testing critical predictions (Popper, 1959; Lakatos, 1970). However,
we have found that emphasizing only criticality can sometimes lead
to experiments that fail to provide much insight into the
phenomenon at hand. To avoid this pitfall, which we describe in
more detail below, we recommend asking a second question. (2)
What would you learn if the prediction were found to be true?
Would such a result increase your confidence in the hypothesis that
made the prediction? If the answer is yes, we call this a ‘persuasive
prediction’. The importance of persuasiveness in hypothesis testing
has not been widely recognized, but in our experience, explicit
consideration of persuasion is helpful for evaluating the power of
various experimental options and finding the experiments that will
be most illuminating.
It is important to stress that criticality and persuasiveness are not
mutually exclusive; in fact the best predictions to test are both
critical and persuasive.

A

In order to illustrate the concepts of criticality and persuasiveness,
let us consider some hypotheses and predictions that our students
generated when thinking about the springtail example we
introduced earlier. Their observation that intertidal springtails
form rafts on the surface of tidepools led them to ask the open-ended
question ‘Why do intertidal springtails form rafts?’. The first
hypothesis they came up with posits that this phenomenon has
something to do with reproduction.
Hypothesis: The rafts are mating aggregations. We will refer to
this as the ‘mating aggregation’ hypothesis.
Based on this hypothesis, they came up with the following
prediction.
Prediction: Anurida maritima is a sexually reproducing species of
springtail.
First, we ask whether the prediction is critical. In other words, if
we found it to be false, i.e. if this species of springtail is an

Fig. 1. The springtail Anurida maritima forms rafts of many individuals on
the surface of tidepools. (A) Large and small rafts of springtails on the water
surface of a tidepool. (B) Close-up of a raft of A. maritima.

obligately asexual species, would that force us to reject the mating
aggregation hypothesis? The answer is yes: the mating aggregation
hypothesis could not survive if we found that A. maritima were not a
sexually reproducing species. Next, we ask whether the prediction is
persuasive. In other words, if we found it to be true, i.e. if
A. maritima is indeed a sexual species, would that increase our
confidence in the mating aggregation hypothesis? The answer to
that question is no, because the vast majority of animal species
reproduce sexually, and so demonstrating sexual reproduction does
little to explain why these rafts form. The lesson here is that it is
possible to come up with predictions that are critical, but not
persuasive. Such a prediction has the potential to disprove a
hypothesis, but little power to convince a skeptic that the hypothesis
is true. More persuasive predictions would contain more detail
about the connection between reproduction and rafting. For
example, the mating aggregation hypothesis also predicts that
only sexually mature adult springtails should be found in rafts, and
that evidence of reproduction (e.g. release of spermatophores by
males) should be observable (Hopkin, 1997). Both of these
predictions are more persuasive than the one about A. maritima
being a sexual species.
Let us consider a completely different hypothesis that we could
put forth for the same question about why springtails form rafts.
Hypothesis: Because of their small mass and the surface tension
of water, springtails on the surface of a tidepool stick to each other
via the ‘Cheerios effect’ (Vella and Mahadevan, 2005). We will
refer to this as the ‘Cheerios’ hypothesis.
Whereas our first hypothesis was biological in nature, this one
poses an entirely physical explanation, i.e. springtails aggregate
because of attractive forces that arise from surface tension effects.
What are some predictions made by this hypothesis?
Prediction: Because the Cheerios effect relies on surface tension,
lowering the surface tension of water with a surfactant will stop
springtails from aggregating.
Firstly, is this prediction critical? That is, if we found that adding
a surfactant (like soap) had no effect on the tendency of the
springtails to form aggregations, must we reject the Cheerios
hypothesis? Not necessarily, because we do not know how much the
surface tension will be lowered by the addition of soap. If it is not
lowered enough to abolish the Cheerios effect, then it is possible
that the aggregations will persist in the presence of soap even if the
Cheerios hypothesis is true. Therefore, this is not a critical
prediction. Secondly, how persuasive would it be if we found that
soap strongly inhibited the formation of springtail rafts? The
prediction is somewhat persuasive, because it demonstrates a
possible link between surface tension and raft formation, just as the
hypothesis proposes. However, a skeptic might say there are other
plausible explanations for how soap might affect raft formation that
have nothing to do with the Cheerios effect. For example, if you
2
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Box 1. Checklist for answering open-ended questions in
experimental biology
1. Identify observations or patterns that are unexplained and ‘puzzling’.
2. Ask an open-ended question about the knowledge gap identified in
step 1. These often begin with ‘How’ or ‘Why’.
3. Generate a list of plausible, intellectually satisfying and logically
consistent answers (i.e. hypotheses) to the question posed in
step 2. Hypotheses should be written in the present tense
and should read like explanations. Hypotheses written in the
future tense are easily confused with predictions.
4. Give each hypothesis a short name (e.g. the Cheerios hypothesis).
This will make it easier to think through the logic of the predictions
that it makes (e.g. ‘If the Cheerios hypothesis is true, then when we
reduce temperature…’).
5. Reflect on each hypothesis and make sure it represents a satisfying
answer to the question posed in step 2. One way to do this is to ask
whether the hypothesis predicts the original puzzling observations
identified in step 1.
6. Generate a list of predictions for each hypothesis. Predictions should
be written in the future tense, as they should describe what a
hypothesis predicts will happen under a given set of experimental
conditions. In this way, predictions are a bridge between hypotheses,
which are abstract ideas, and experiments, which are concrete
scenarios in the real world. If you are having trouble coming up with
predictions, ask yourself what the essential differences are amongst
the hypotheses you are considering. Under what conditions will your
competing hypotheses make divergent predictions?
7. Ask whether your predictions are critical and/or persuasive. Ideally,
you will generate some predictions that are both critical and
persuasive. If a prediction is lacking in criticality or persuasiveness,
try revising it to address this.
8. If you have multiple experimental options, start with the experiments
that test the most critical and persuasive predictions.
9. Run the experiment and collect the data.
10. Analyze the data and decide (using statistical methods if necessary)
whether the various predictions made by your hypotheses are true
or false.
11. For critical predictions found to be false, reject the hypotheses that
made them. For persuasive predictions found to be true, increase
your confidence in those hypotheses.
12. Experimental results often generate new and puzzling observations.
To find answers to new questions raised by these observations,
return to step 1.

suspected that rafts form because springtails actively paddle towards
their nearest neighbor, then one can imagine that adding soap to the
water might poison the springtails and stop them from paddling.
Thus, one component of a prediction’s persuasiveness is its
potential to exclude competing hypotheses.
In the above example, asking whether a prediction is critical
and/or persuasive forced us to think hard about what we might
learn from testing it, and we concluded that the prediction as
written is not critical. Is it possible to change it so that it becomes
more critical? Doing a bit of reading about the physics of surface
tension leads us to the fact that surfactants reduce surface tension
in a concentration-dependent manner. Perhaps making our
prediction more specific would make it more critical. Consider
the following revision.
Prediction: Inhibition of raft formation in springtails will depend
on surfactant concentration.
Is this prediction now more critical than the original? What would
we learn if it were found to be false, i.e. if raft formation were
completely unaffected by surfactant concentration? By doing the
experiment over a wide range of concentrations, we are much more
likely to lower the surface tension to a point where it will interfere
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with the Cheerios effect. If we find that raft formation is unaffected
by the addition of surfactant over the entire range of concentrations,
this would deal a more serious blow to the Cheerios hypothesis than
the simpler experiment of just adding some soap and seeing whether
it affects raft formation. Thus, our new prediction is more critical
than its predecessor. Is it entirely critical though? The answer is no,
because it is possible that the chosen surfactant does not lower the
surface tension enough to interfere with the Cheerios effect in a way
that would inhibit rafting. In this case, the lack of criticality is the
result of our lack of knowledge of two things: (1) the amount of
surface tension required for the Cheerios effect, and (2) the degree to
which a given concentration of our surfactant will lower the surface
tension. Consideration of these issues before doing an experiment
will likely lead us to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms we
are proposing and would push us to make our hypothesis and
predictions even more explicit. It is also possible that springtails
might compensate for a surfactant-induced loss of surface tension
by paddling to stay close to their neighbors. Indeed, the ability of
organisms to change their behavior, physiology or morphology can
often confound our attempts to probe mechanistic hypotheses by
reducing the criticality of our predictions.
How persuasive is the new prediction? What would we learn if we
found it to be true, i.e. that raft formation was inhibited more and
more as we increased surfactant concentration? We decided that the
original prediction was somewhat persuasive, but that it could be
more persuasive, given that other hypotheses could account for an
inhibition of raft formation with the addition of surfactant. Is the
new prediction more persuasive? The answer is yes, because finding
it to be true would not only establish that rafting is affected by a
surfactant but also demonstrate a more detailed quantitative
relationship between these two variables that is consistent with the
hypothesis. Of course, finding this prediction to be true would not
confirm the Cheerios hypothesis, but it would reduce the number of
hypotheses that can explain both the original puzzling observation
(springtails form rafts) and our new observations (raft formation and
surfactant concentration are negatively correlated). Earlier, we
raised the alternative possibility that rafts form when springtails
paddle toward their nearest neighbor. If we found that adding soap
inhibits raft formation, the ‘nearest neighbor’ hypothesis could
account for this result, but it would have a much harder time
explaining why the effect should be concentration dependent.
Although it is possible that the nearest neighbor hypothesis might
predict a surfactant concentration-dependent effect, it is unlikely
that the shape of the response curve would be the same as that
predicted by a mechanism involving a loss of surface tension. To
summarize, the more specific prediction is more critical and more
persuasive than the original; therefore, the experiment it leads to is
better because it has greater potential to either falsify or bolster the
hypothesis.
Thinking about the persuasiveness of a prediction has the added
benefit of forcing us to think about alternative hypotheses, which in
turn can lead to new lines of inquiry. Let us explicitly consider one
of these hypotheses – the nearest neighbor hypothesis – and a
prediction that it makes.
Hypothesis: Springtails tend to paddle toward their nearest
neighbor, which over time leads to rafts.
Prediction: Immobilizing the springtails will abolish raft
formation.
Is this a critical prediction? In other words, if we immobilized
springtails and they still formed rafts, would it force us to reject the
nearest neighbor hypothesis? The answer seems to be yes; it would
be difficult for the hypothesis to survive such a result. What about
3
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the persuasiveness of this prediction? What would we potentially
learn if immobilizing the springtails inhibited raft formation?
Thinking deeply about this question makes us realize that the
persuasiveness might depend on exactly how we immobilize them,
because our method will determine whether we can simultaneously
evaluate the Cheerios hypothesis. For example, if we immobilize the
springtails by killing them with soap, a negative effect on raft
formation would not be very persuasive for the Cheerios hypothesis
because it would not be clear whether rafting had been disrupted by
the reduction in surface tension or the reduction in paddling. Ideally,
we would find an experiment for which the Cheerios and nearest
neighbor hypotheses make divergent predictions. Such an
experiment is what Platt would refer to as a ‘crucial experiment’.
What if we used cold temperature to immobilize the springtails?
Because springtails are ectotherms, their activity should decrease at
low temperatures, and thus the nearest neighbor hypothesis predicts
that raft formation should be inhibited as we reduce the temperature
and should be maximally inhibited at a temperature when they stop
moving completely. Conveniently, lowering temperature increases
surface tension; this is ideal, because when temperature is reduced,
the nearest neighbor hypothesis predicts that rafting should be
inhibited, and the Cheerios hypothesis predicts that it should be
strengthened. In this case, thinking hard about the persuasiveness of
a prediction has led us to a ‘crucial’ experiment.
What makes predictions persuasive?

Above, we have provided several examples where considering
persuasiveness has led to more informative experiments, but what
exactly makes a prediction persuasive or unpersuasive? From the
above examples, we can see that persuasiveness comes from the
ability to convince a skeptic that a hypothesis has merit. A skeptic
can be defined as ‘one who is willing to question any claim to
truth, asking for clarity in definition, consistency in logic, and
adequacy of evidence’ (Kurtz, 1992). We realize that our
definition of persuasion is inherently fuzzy, because convincing
someone that an idea has merit is not an all-or-none endeavor, but
rather relies on the subjective judgment of a skeptical person.
Unlike the process of falsification, where a false critical prediction
can lead to the wholesale rejection of a hypothesis, there is no clear
moment when a skeptic declares that they are persuaded. This
situation arises from the fundamental hypothetico-deductive
principle that hypotheses can never be definitively proven, only
supported or disproven.
Although the persuasiveness of a prediction can be somewhat
fuzzy, we have identified some common themes of effective
scientific persuasion. At a minimum, a skeptic will want to see
honest, good faith attempts to falsify a hypothesis, which
underscores the importance of critical predictions. However, as
we have shown, not all critical predictions are persuasive, so clearly
there is more to the story. We have found that the most persuasive
predictions are those that push the limits of what should be
observable if a given hypothesis is true. These predictions are
usually highly specific, quantitative and contain details that align
closely with the hypothesis. Unpersuasive predictions tend to be
‘safe’ and focus on observations that are vague and likely to be true.
For example, our prediction about the relationship between
surfactant dose and rafting response is more persuasive than a
prediction about simply adding a single dose of surfactant. An
added benefit of highly specific predictions is that they have greater
potential to falsify competing hypotheses because the more
elaborate and specific a prediction is, the less likely it is that other
hypotheses will make the same prediction. In short, persuasive
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predictions help lead us to Platt’s ‘crucial experiments’ by focusing
on experimental conditions for which competing hypotheses are
more likely to make divergent predictions. Of course, because no
single persuasive prediction can ‘prove’ a hypothesis, finding
multiple persuasive predictions to be true builds a body of evidence
that is often more convincing than the results of a single experiment.
Conclusions

We hope we have persuaded you that both the criticality and
persuasiveness of predictions should be considered when deciding
which lines of experimentation to pursue. If you realize that a given
prediction is neither critical nor persuasive, think about how it (and
the experiment it implies) might be revised to increase the chances
that you will learn something regardless of the experimental
outcome (Box 1). We should add that the whole point of doing
things this way is to speed progress. If trying to generate predictions
that are both critical and persuasive leads to paralysis, then it makes
good sense to forge ahead by testing predictions that might still lack
one of these elements. As most scientists know, generating a fresh
set of observations can sometimes break a logjam, even if the exact
implications of those observations are not clear before the
experiment is done.
Thinking hard about whether predictions are critical and
persuasive has the added benefit of making it easier to write
manuscripts and grant proposals and respond to reviewer critiques.
Laying out a study in terms of puzzling observations, hypotheses,
predictions and experiments aligns well with the logical structure of
scientific papers and is especially helpful for writing Introduction
and Discussion sections in which the narrative is obvious and the
stakes of each experiment are clear. Furthermore, testing the
strongest possible critical predictions signals to a reviewer that you
have taken your responsibility to falsify your hypothesis seriously,
and striving for persuasive predictions means that you have pushed
your hypothesis to its logical limits and have considered a number of
reasonable alternative hypotheses.
Working through the scientific process in the manner we describe
here is clearly a lot of work. Why bother to ask open-ended
questions, develop competing hypotheses and evaluate the
criticality and persuasiveness of predictions when it is often easier
to focus on constrained questions? Our view is that open-ended
questions are a simple and powerful tool for developing broad,
mechanistic explanations of how the world works. Answering
constrained questions is undoubtedly an important part of the
scientific process and can provide detailed observations about how
variables interact under specific conditions. However, there are
drawbacks to starting with constrained questions and considering
their implications only after the data are in. One risk is that thinking
hard about the implications of a dataset often reveals that it would
have been better to do the experiment in a different way; having this
realization earlier in the process is almost always beneficial.
Another consideration is that writing a thoughtful Discussion
section of a manuscript involves thinking deeply about what the data
say about the merit of various ideas in the scientific literature, and
doing this rigorously involves asking what each of these ideas
predicts for the experiments that were carried out. If a researcher
needs to engage in this process while writing a manuscript, why not
do it before the experiments are planned and executed? The
difference in the timing of this process can sometimes be the
difference between the rigorous testing of hypotheses and hand
waving.
There are other important advantages to this approach. Asking an
open-ended question is a deliberate act of open-mindedness that
4
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creates space for multiple competing hypotheses (Chamberlin,
1890). In contrast, constrained questions often have an explanatory
hypothesis built into them, which can result in the experimenter
becoming ‘attached’ to a particular explanation before the data are
collected (Betini et al., 2017). We feel that the approach we are
advocating can help remedy some possible causes of the
reproducibility crisis that threatens to undermine the credibility of
science and scientists (Ioannidis, 2005). By focusing on open-ended
questions, entertaining multiple working hypotheses and testing
multiple predictions for a given hypothesis, we are less likely to fall
into the traps of p-hacking, only reporting ‘significant’ data or
hypothesizing after results are known (‘HARKing’; Kerr, 1998).
Carrying out an experiment for which hypotheses make divergent
predictions (i.e. a ‘crucial’ experiment) means that its outcome will
illuminate the question at hand, regardless of whether the results are
‘significant’ or not.
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